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CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS
RichardAbel*
Civil rights and tort law are natural allies. Both offer legal
responses for harms to (often vulnerable) individuals committed by
(generally powerful) collectivities. Yet the two domains differ
dramatically in many respects, including substantive and procedural
law, remedies, lawyers, and public image. Only by deepening our
understanding of these differences can we mobilize the
complementary strengths of these two legal weapons in the struggle
against injustice.
Economics constructs torts, whose dominant moral philosophy
is utilitarian. Tortfeasors are negligent because care costs money.
(Negligent tortfeasors are generally indifferent to the identity of their
victims.) In a market economy, competition compels entrepreneurs
to be as unsafe as they can get away with being. And Learned Hand's
famous formula' reassures them that courts will not find them
negligent when the harm they inflict costs less than the safety
precautions that would have been necessary to prevent it. Torts are
takings from victims of their physical and psychic well-being,
earning power, savings, relationships, even life itself. The legal
system creates an incentive to injure those whom society endows
with less human capital (earning capacity, recourse to quality health
care, even capacity to enjoy life), who are also (partly for similar
reasons) less likely to respond by suing. 2 (The poor also have less
bargaining power to demand workplace safety and less purchasing
power to buy it in consumer products, or even to protect themselves
Connell Professor of Law, University of California Los Angeles.
1. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
2. Because we lack a metric for general damages, these are often
proportioned to specials, amplifying the biased incentive. In New York City,
23/100,000 of those in households earning less than $25,000/year die of
unintentional injuries, compared with 10/100,000 of those in households
*

earning more than $50,000. New York City Health Disparities,N.Y. TIMES,

.July 16, 2004, at B3.
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against the weapons of the rich-as when they have the misfortune
to collide with SUVs.) These market failures can be corrected only
by politics, i.e. legislation. Most tort defendants are private entities;
indeed, sovereign immunity is a significant obstacle to suing the
state. Because the rights that tort law seeks to vindicate are private
and individual, victims are generally free to sell them ex ante (by
agreements not to sue) and ex post (through settlements, which can
even include purchase of the victim's right to speak about the claim).
. Politics constructs civil rights, whose dominant moral
philosophy is deontological. (The Bush Administration's efforts to
justify torture on utilitarian grounds provoked widespread outrage.)
Wrongdoers seek to oppress and subordinate, not to maximize profit
(although the two can be related); they therefore care about the
identity of their victims. Ironically, the targets are often the more
rather than the less privileged, those who challenge power politically
(social movement leaders), symbolically (cultural rebels), or sexually
(by violating taboos against miscegenation or same-sex
relationships). The political system creates a perpetual incentive to
subordinate. Because inequality breeds resistance, it must constantly
be reconstructed, reenacted, reinforced. This is a zero-sum game:
people can enhance their own power and status only by
disempowering and humiliating others. Those who violate civil
rights appeal to members of their own group, both through electoral
politics and the institutions of civil society. They are not driven
primarily by material incentives; indeed, neoclassical economics
insists that discrimination is impossible because it is inefficient, i.e.,
the invisible hand ineluctably corrects political failure. (Would this
were so.) Most civil rights defendants are public entities; indeed, the
state action doctrine is a significant obstacle to suing private actors
for constitutional violations. Because civil rights are public and
collective, they cannot be abridged by contract (e.g., contracts for
slavery, or compounding a felony).
The gatekeeper to law for the tort victim is the private
practitioner, usually working alone or in small firms. The plaintiffs'
personal injury bar is large, geographically dispersed (at least in
cities and suburbs, though not rural areas),3 and generally culturally
3. Compare JEROME CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 71-91(1962) and
CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF
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accessible (in terms of the class, race, and language of lawyers and
their employees, partly because minority lawyers excluded from
other career alternatives often gravitate to personal injury practice).4
At the same time, restrictions on solicitation in person, 5 by
telephone, and even through the mails 6 impede lawyer efforts to
inform victims of their rights. 7 Lawyers willing to risk discipline by
collaborating with or employing ambulance chasers charge a vice tax
to clients, which increases cost, restricts providers, and lowers
quality. 8 Unauthorized practice of law rules prevent laypersons from
advising or representing victims; and intermediaries (lay or lawyer)
cannot be paid for referrals in most states. 9 (In England, by contrast,
claims agents can solicit cases, negotiate settlements, and sell cases
to lawyers for litigation.) 10 General practitioners charge fees for
forwarding cases to litigation specialists (although these are
supposed to be proportioned to the work invested); because of
unauthorized practice restrictions, such fees include a monopoly rent
for referrals that could be performed more efficiently by laypeople. 1
The contingent fee gives lawyers an incentive to seek such work; but
SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS (1996), with David Engel, The Oven
Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American
Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 551 (1987); and DONALD LANDON,
COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

23-30 (1990).
4. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 111-16 (rev. ed., 1994).

5. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978).
6. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1993).
7. Kenneth Reichstein, Ambulance Chasing: A Case Study of Deviation
and Control Within the Legal Profession, 13 SOC. PROBS. 3, 9 (1965)
(concluding without ambulance-chasing lawyers, injured parties would not
necessarily be provided with legal representation against insurance
companies).
8. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
(1968). See also Reichstein, supra note 7, at 12 (finding that solicitation also
leads to "fraud and client exploitation").
9. See, e.g., Legal Business Solicitation Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
210/1-3 (West 1993) ("It shall be unlawful for any person not an attorney at
law to solicit ... any demand or claim for personal injuries.
").
10. RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE

230-32 (2003).
11. See CARLIN, supra note 3, at 83-86 ("Cowboys" file prematurely,
seeking publicity in order to hawk the case for the highest price-to a litigation
specialist or the defendant).
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it also skews their case preferences toward certain liability, high
damages, and visibility (both for ego gratification and to attract other
work). 12 Contingent fees create a perverse incentive to settle quickly
and low (maximizing lawyer return on time invested at the expense
of client recovery) and to accept less on high-value claims in order to
obtain more on low-value claims (from the same defendant or
insurer).1 3 Because a claim is only as good as the defendant's
solvency, tort law diverts attention from more to less culpable
defendants through the (often strained) doctrines of duty and
proximate cause. Although most personal injury lawyers occupy the
14
bottom of the professional hierarchy in terms of income and status,
a few are obscenely rich-notably the tobacco litigation
billionaires-wealth that is acquired at the expense of full
compensation for their clients. Some successful lawyers seek to
transform wealth into status by creating exclusive clubs, such as the
Inner Circle of Advocates-a "million dollar club," the American
Board of Trial Advocates, the International Academy of Trial
Lawyers, and the Richard Grand Society. Of course, these practices
just intensify public detestation.
Unlike tort lawyers, civil rights attorneys are not largely
motivated by monetary incentives.' 5 Because there are many fewer
private civil rights lawyers, they are geographically less accessible.
(They may be culturally more accessible if categories previously
excluded from the legal profession enter it imbued with a passion for
justice.) Civil rights lawyers may solicit as long as they do not
charge clients fees; 16 but they have weaker material incentives to do
12. Lisa Girion, Justice Denied?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at C1 (lawyers
unwilling to take medical malpractice cases because of damage caps).
13. See Matthew Scully, Contingency Fees: Another Name for Champerty,

J., Nov. 10, 1997, at A23 ("Look at some of the fastest-growing
legal practices... [such as torts] ... and you will find ... the highest damage

WALL ST.

awards and the highest lawyer profiles.").
14. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 4, at 100, 107.

15. Neil K. Komesar & Burton A. Weisbrod, The Public InterestLaw Firm:
A Behavioral Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 80, 85 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978).
16. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 425 (1978).
The Legal Services

Corporation, however, has its own restrictions under § 504(a)(18) of the 1996
Legal Services Corporation Appropriations Act. See Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110
Stat. 1321, 1321-56 (1996).
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so. There are no restrictions on uncompensated referrals, whether
from other lawyers or laypeople or organizations (but there is no
market for referrals).' 7 They are paid not at the expense of their
clients but by government, philanthropy, or defendants. But feeshifting statutes, foundation funding (and tax exempt status), and
government employment all skew the cases they take.' 8 Monetary
incentives are subordinated to those of cause lawyering: vindicating
Public interest lawyers are
principle, gaining recognition. 19
notoriously possessive about their cases and causes. 20 No one gets
rich doing civil rights law, but a few receive well-deserved
recognition, from their peers, the profession, even the wider society
(Clarence Darrow, Charles Hamilton Houston, and Thurgood
Marshall). 2 1 Government agencies (state attorneys general, city
attorneys, prosecutors, the EEOC, and state and city antidiscrimination bodies) are constrained and shaped by inadequate
focus on
resources, bureaucracy, and career incentives. These bodies
a2
collective prevention rather than individual remediation.
The "dark figure" of unasserted legitimate claims 23 differs in the
two domains. Empirical studies repeatedly confirm (contrary to the
myths propagated by tort "reformers") that only a small proportion of

17. See NAACP v. Button, .371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (finding such

restrictions violative of the First Amendment).
18. See Komesar & Weisbrod, supra note 15, at 88.
19. LAWYERING ON THE LEFT: CAUSES, POLITICS, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1997); CAUSE
LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart

Scheingold eds., 2001); Komesar & Weisbrod, supra note 15, at 80, 85.

20. MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS

MOVEMENT 1960-73 (1993).

21. See, e.g., The Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture: Frank M.
Coffin Lecture on Law and Public Service: In Pursuitof Public Good: Lawyers
of Care, in 53 ME. L. REv. 301, 304 (2000) (lauding lawyers who have
dedicated themselves to the public good, including Charles Hamilton Houston
and Thurgood Marshall.)

22. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (finding
systemic exclusion of a particular group necessary in order to merit a Due
Process Clause claim).
23. See, e.g., William L.F. Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming...,

15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 (1980-81); Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson,
Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 775 (1980-81).
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eligible tort victims recover damages (about 10 percent). 24 It seems
likely that claims vary directly with income and wealth, which render
such claims more valuable to both victims and their contingent fee
lawyers (although some of these claims may be brought by
subrogated loss insurers). 25 The likelihood of claims being brought
and won directly influences the incentive for safety. 26 Accordingly,
entrepreneurs endanger those who are least costly to injure. Legal
"need" studies show an even lower rate of civil rights claiming, but
we know less about the population of eligible claimants. 27 These
high and different levels of selectivity also introduce biases in terms
of class, race, gender, and immigration status. 2 8 Thus, the reasons
for and hence the size and demographics of the dark figure differ in
the two domains.
These two legal domains appear to have different dynamics of
growth. Tort law tends to grow through judicial innovation.
Noteworthy examples include the right to privacy, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and strict
liability. But legislatures can and do reverse such expansion, driven
by powerful special interests (doctors, insurers, manufacturers, cities,
etc.). 29 Because state supreme courts have struck down numerous
24. DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS
AND INJURY (1984); Alfred Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile
Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279 (1964); WILLIAM SCHWARTZ & NEIL
KOMESAR, DOCTORS, DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE: AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

(Rand 2340-NIH/RC 1978); PATRICIA DANZON,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1985);

Engel, supra note 3; Thomas Moriarty, A Nation of Willing Victims: Urban
Dangerand Urban Insult, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1975, at 43; INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-FINAL REPORT (1978); DEBORAH
HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES (1991).
25. BARBARA CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977).

26. Special Issue on Toxic Torts and Environmental Justice, 26(2) LAW &
POL'Y (2004); Jim Yardley, Rivers Run Black, and Chinese Die of Cancer,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, at Al.
27. Leon Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the
Public, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 401 (1975); CURRAN, supra note 25.
28. M.P. Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in 2 TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 79 (Donald Black ed., 1984); HAZEL
GENN, MEETING LEGAL NEEDS?
PERSONAL INJURY VICTIMS (1982).

AN

EVALUATION

OF

A

SCHEME

FOR

29. Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-MajoritarianThesis: The
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tort "reform" statutes on state constitutional grounds, these interests
increasingly seek to influence the election of state supreme court
judges through massive campaign contributions.3 °
Civil rights law, by contrast, grows primarily through
legislation, as illustrated by the Civil War amendments and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 after Brown v. Board of Education.3 1 "Massive
resistance" by state and even federal judges can be an obstacle, as in
the post-Brown South. Consequently, civil rights enforcement is
limited by the (local) political consensus. Nonetheless, federal (and
as Republican appointments make the federal judiciary more
conservative, increasingly state) constitutional provisions remain a
potential source of expansion. But referenda and constitutional
amendments can curtail civil rights.32 State courts make most tort
law; federal courts have the final word in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution and federal statutes.
Unlike civil rights law, which is primarily enforced by
government agencies, most tort cases are tried before juries.
Laypeople may misunderstand the law. 33 Because it is so difficult
and risky to buy a jury, it rarely occurs (although those who can
afford jury research may use voir dire to bias the panel). Insofar as
civil rights are enforced initially by administrative agencies (which
screen complaints), the political priorities of majority groups (which
are hostile to minorities), bureaucratic overload, and simple
Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 533 (1999).
30. See Adam Liptak, JudicialRaces in Several States Become Partisan
Battlegrounds,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 1 at 1; Justice at Stake Campaign,
at http://www.justiceatstake.org; Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform's Threat to an
Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835 (2002); KYLE CHEEK &
ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN TEXAS: PARTISANSHIP, MONEY,
AND POLITICS IN STATE COURTS (forthcoming).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII; U.S. CONST.

Amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. Amend. XV; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000 (1964).
32. For example, California Proposition 187 was aimed against immigrants
and California Proposition 209 ended public sector affirmative action.
Additionally, many states have recently proposed and enacted laws and
constitutional amendments against gay marriage.
33. We know little empirically about the effect of jury instructions or
judicial directions to ignore inadmissible evidence. But see NEIL VIDMAR,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE AWARDS (1995).
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indifference can frustrate implementation. For instance, prosecutors
are notoriously protective of police, on whom they rely for cases and
34
testimony, and hence reluctant to prosecute misconduct vigorously.
Reagan and Bush appointees to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
have restricted civil rights investigations. Similarly, their appointees
to the EPA and NLRB have been anti-environmental and anti35
labor.
The vast majority of tort claims are based on negligence (and
most of the rest on strict liability). 36 Indeed, contemporary American
tort law transforms intentional injuries by criminals (who tend to be
anonymous and indigent) into negligent injuries by identifiable,
solvent entities that might have prevented crimes (prisons, mental
hospitals, landlords, retailers, gun manufacturers and sellers).37 In
doing so, it reconceptualizes a civil rights violation as a tort. (By
contrast, tribal societies transform what we consider "acts of God" or
"inevitable accident" into intentional torts through beliefs in
witchcraft and sorcery, which attribute agency to anger and
jealousy.) 38 Although torts scholars continue to debate the relative
merits and the definition of those two kinds of mens rea, even
negligence generally is not that difficult to prove. 39 At the same
time, the lower mens rea of most torts entails less moral blame. By
contrast, the intent required for most civil rights violations is a major
stumbling block to finding culpability, but such a finding carries
34. See, e.g., Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
149, 153 (1998).
35. The Commission blocked publication before the November 2004
election of its report "Redefining Rights in America-The Civil Rights Record
of the George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2004." Michael Janofsky, Study
ofBush and CivilRights Draws Fire,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A22.
36. See, e.g., KENNETH A. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF
TORT LAW 53 (1997).
37. Henry Weinstein,

Slain Postman's Mother Can Sue Weapon Makers,
L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2004, at B 1; Fox Butterfield, Sniper Victims in Settlement

With Gun Maker andDealer,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A13.
38. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONG
THE AZANDE (1937); M. MARWICK, SORCERY IN ITS SOCIAL SETTING: A
STUDY OF THE NORTHERN RHODESIA CEWA! (1965); WITCHCRAFT AND
SORCERY IN EAST AFRICA (John Middleton & Edward Henry Winter eds.,

1963).

39. But see Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-OrientedApproach to Strict Tort
Liabilityfor Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 355

(1996).
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greater opprobrium.
While tort is concerned with both actions and consequences,
civil rights law is primarily concerned with actions. This has
important implications. Tort is torn between its often divergent goals
of compensating for consequences and deterring and passing moral
judgment on conduct. 40 It addresses both past and future, victim and
offender. Is it morally acceptable to impose liability (for purposes of
compensation and deterrence) when the defendant's conduct seems
innocent (strict liability)? Or to leave unreasonable risk creation
uncorrected where it does not result in harm? Is it appropriate to
impose damages to deter even when the victim cannot be
compensated (loss of enjoyment for a comatose victim)? 4 1 The
imperative of compensation for catastrophic harms may persuade
judges and juries to stretch (some would say distort) moral concepts
of duty and causation and to demand inefficient levels of care. These
tensions contribute to criticism of and distrust for tort. (Doctrines of
duty and proximate cause attempt to mediate the tensions, but in an
ad hoc and unprincipled fashion.) 42 Because civil rights claims do
not seek to compensate the victim, they can focus on deterrence and
moral judgment, which are more often congruent.
Perhaps the single most important difference between 'the two
regimes is their remedies. The only tort remedy is damages, which
strongly motivate both victims and lawyers to sue. (Injunctions are
Remedies are
limited to nuisance, really a property claim.)
individual (even in class actions damages have to be individually
calculated, one reason courts increasingly disfavor tort class
actions). 43 Juries determine damages, introducing systematic errors
(although judges order remittitur and legislatures impose caps).44
Privilege enhances tort damages; deprivation depresses it. (The
opposite tends to be true in civil rights actions, where the most
40. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Alfred, 960 P.2d 628, 632 (Ariz. 1998).
41. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246 (1989). California business
interests successfully backed Proposition 64 on the November 2004 ballot,
which amended the Unfair Business Competition Law, passed in 1933, to
require a showing of damage.
42. E.g., Richard L. Abel, Judges Write the Darndest Things: Judicial
Mystification ofLimitations on Tort Liability, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1547 (2002).
43. E.g., Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
44. Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
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vulnerable victims evoke the greatest sympathy.) Unless punitive
damages are available, imposed, and sustained on appeal (a tiny
fraction of cases),45 tortfeasors can continue to engage in wrongful
conduct as long as they are prepared to pay its costs. 46 (The
nineteenth-century Knights of Labor wanted workers to control
workplace risk rather than let employers pay trivial amounts of blood
money for the right to injure employees; even today some victims are
more interested in protecting others from suffering what the victims
did than in being compensated.) 47 The U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decisions requiring that punitive damages be proportional to
compensatory damages subordinate civil rights goals to torts.48
Payment perversely expropriates victims' injuries.49
It
commodifies experience: tort damages equate pain and suffering,
loss of enjoyment, and impaired relationships with money. 50 For
example, the New York workers compensation schedule gives those
who lose a big toe 38 weeks wages. 51 Whatever lacks economic
value to the living usually goes uncompensated. 52 Damages replace
pity with envy and resentment towards those who win the torts
lottery. That is one reason why victims of intentional torts are often
ambivalent about accepting payment, which might appear to absolve
45. Id.; MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS (N-2342-ICJ 1985).
46. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1992) (illustrating

Holmes's "bad man" theory of law).
47. Jonathan Garlock, The Knights of Labor Courts: A Case Study of

Popular Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 17-34 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Mike Anton, Shooting Victim
Is Outbidfor Costa Mesa Gun Maker, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at B5; Fox
Butterfield, Teenager Fails In Bid to Buy Gun Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,

2004, at A 12.
48. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 403 (2003);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
49. Leslie Eaton, Grant From 9/11 Victim Fund Is Bittersweet for a

Survivor, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at A26; cf Nils Christie, Conflicts as
Property, 17 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).

50. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633-8.5(a) (Michie 1993).
51. N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 15 (McKinney 2004).

52. For example, tort law generally does not compensate for: (1) lost years
for the deceased-or even the comatose, which could still be a civil rights
violation; and (2) anything other than labor value in workers compensation
(e.g., senses of taste and smell, sexual function, reproductive capacity,
relationships).
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53

the wrongdoer of guilt.
If wealthy defendants can buy their way out of tort liability, poor
(or devious) defendants can simply default. Corporations declare
54
strategic bankruptcy (asbestos, Dalkon shield, Bhopal, etc.).
Poorer victims may be more likely to confront judgment-proof
defendants: criminals, thinly capitalized fly-by-night employers,
manufacturers of Saturday-night specials, unlicensed medical
practitioners. Court congestion allows defendants to stall and drive
down the price of a settlement. 55 Differences in need for wage
replacement and medical care and in coverage by loss insurance may
intensify class, race, and gender bias in willingness to accept a low
Some defendants seek to propagate a reputation for
offer.56
intransigence: self-insurers like the Magic Kingdom and UCLA;
AAA automobile insurance. Settlement (especially if the defendant
buys the plaintiff's silence) also frustrates both the victim's desire for
public moral vindication and recovery by other mass tort victims.
Nevertheless, execution of tort remedies is usually relatively
straightforward and quick once judgment is final. There is, however,
little reason to believe that damage payments have the desired effect
53. For example, relatives of those killed in the bombing of the Pan Am
plane that crashed at Lockerbie objected to payments by Libya and the
reintegration of Muammar Quaddafi into the international community. Some

Holocaust victims and their relatives have similar attitudes towards German
reparations.
54. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).

55. ALFRED CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND
PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964);
HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL
J. HAMMITT, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
(1987);
ACTIONS
INJURY
COMPENSATION: PAYMENTS BY AUTO INSURERS

(1985); J.

KAKALIK ET AL.,

COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION (1988);
H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTFLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (2d ed. 1980); Patricia Danzon & Lee

Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1983); Marc Franklin et al., Accidents, Money
and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61

COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1961); Michael Rosenberg & Maurice Sovern, Delay and
the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959);
E. KING & J. SMITH, ECONOMIC Loss AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION
ACCIDENTS

(1989).

56. GENN, supra note 55; Ross, supra note 55; Hazel Genn, Who Claims

Compensation:FactorsAssociated with Claiming and ObtainingDamages, in
24.

HARRIS ET AL., supra note
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of making the tortfeasors safer in the future, much less "optimally"
safe (especially in the vast majority of cases where damages are paid
by a collectivity rather than the culpable actor). There is even
greater reason to be skeptical about the general deterrent effect of
tort damages, especially given that most cases are settled, many
settlements are sealed, and few of the rare judgments are publicized
57
to potential tortfeasors.
Civil rights actions may award damages, but they also can
produce injunctions, special masters, receiverships, and criminal
penalties. Unfortunately, damages leave to tortfeasors the decisions
of whether and how to change. Judges craft civil rights remedies,
which can make recidivism prohibitively expensive. But precisely
because of their draconian nature, courts are very reluctant to issue
such orders or compel compliance (the most notorious example is the
Supreme Court's "all deliberate speed" qualification in Brown I1).58
The civil rights equivalents of tort settlements are consent decrees
and plea bargains, in which victims (and government lawyers)
relinquish full enforcement of rights in return for greater certainty of
success at lower cost. Outcomes tend to be well publicized (which is
true of only the largest or most innovative tort judgments or those
involving celebrity parties). Remedies are collective rather than
individual and strongly normative.
They increase public
condemnation of wrongdoers rather than eliminating it (demonizing
racists like Bull Connor, Orville Faubus, George Wallace) and
proclaim, even intensify, sympathy for victims. Violator poverty
does not preclude punishment; indeed, it exacerbates the impact of
fines.
Unlike civil rights remedies, tort damages are a regressive tax.
Some of the costs are paid by consumers (like a sales tax). The
tobacco settlements are a perfect example: the hundreds of billions of
dollars of damages will be paid by those whom the cigarette
manufacturers
succeeded
in
addicting
to
nicotinedisproportionately poor people of color, increasingly women. 59
57. But see Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:

Does Tort Law Really Deter?,42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994).

58. Steven Yeazell & Theodore Eisenberg, The Ordinary and the

Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation,93 HARV. L. REv. 464 (1980).
59. See The Oral Cancer Foundation, Demographics of Tobacco Use, at
http://www.oralcancerfoundation.org/tobacco/demographicstobacco.htm

Spring 2005]

CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS

1433

Other costs are paid by liability insurance premiums. When we
make liability insurance a condition of automobile registration, the
vast majority of owners with low to moderate incomes and relatively
inexpensive cars ay to protect the privileged few with high incomes
and luxury cars. By contrast, much of the cost of both bringing and
satisfying civil rights claims against the state is paid out of taxes,
which are at least somewhat more progressive.
A long, well-funded, profoundly duplicitous but unfortunately
highly effective propaganda campaign by tort defendants has
convinced a large proportion of Americans (and perhaps even more
abroad) that plaintiffs' lawyers are parasitic, victims undeserving,
tort claims frivolous, damages excessive, and liabilities a serious
It argues by anecdote that medical
burden on the economy.
malpractice insurance premiums drive doctors out of practice,
lawsuits force playground closures, and products liability costs
American workers jobs. 62 (A particular egregious example is a fullpage New York Times advertisement by The Club for Growth
blaming the flu vaccine shortage on trial lawyers-and John Kerry
and John Edwards!) 6 3 ATLA has replied with a number of public
interest campaigns, most recently Trial Lawyers Care: free
representation before the 9.11 compensation fund.64 By contrast,
each new assertion of a civil rights claim generally stokes public
outrage: Rodney King, Abner Louima, the release of those
imprisoned for crimes they did not commit (especially death-row
inmates), and the entire history of the African American struggle for
equality. Of course, civil rights campaigns can also provoke
(Jan. 23, 2005).

60. See, e.g., Editorial, Make Insurance Rates The Same for Rich, Poor,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2001.
61.
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FREEDOM (2002).
63. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at A7.
64. Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund Born from a Unique
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backlash: against affirmative action, feminism (blamed for
undermining the family), and "special rights" for gays and lesbians.
Still, the public is far more likely to express sympathy for the few
Thai immigrants enslaved by a Los Angeles garment factory and
skepticism toward the mass of workers who claim compensation for
routine injuries suffered in the course of employment.
Torts and civil rights are potentially powerful allies. 65 Tort
litigation provides a secure economic base of practice. Victims are
numerous, geographically dispersed, and transcend race and
class (indeed, the disadvantaged probably are over represented).
Expansions of duty and proximate cause and the spread of insurance
(often compulsory) ensure the availability of a deep pocket
defendant. Unlike government agencies (including prosecutors),
plaintiffs' lawyers and juries are invulnerable to political capture.
The vast majority of cases are settled. Remedies are readily executed.
The contingent fee amply finances claims, even where liability is
uncertain and defendants intransigent and wealthy. Civil rights law,
by contrast, confers legitimacy. Causes are noble, victims deserving,
and violators vile. Therefore, lawyers can be proactive. Remedies
are collective and prospective. Collaboration between torts and civil
rights lawyers can only enhance the ability of both to be more
vigorous, effective advocates for their clients.

65. Steven Greenhouse, Woman Sues Costco, Claiming Sex Bias in
Promotions,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at C3 (national class action in which
the plaintiffs were represented by Bill Lann Lee, among other lawyers).

